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On 5 June 2000 the US Supreme Court declared, in Troxel v Granville,1 that a Washington 
grandparent visitation statute infringed parental rights under the US Constitution.Three days 
later, in the Family Division of the English High Court, Mr Justice Wall, referring to the 
European Convention on Human Rights - albeit in the different context of contact with children 
in care- seemed to be dismayed at the prospect of the court being faced with similar rights-based 
appeals: His Lordship said he would be ‘disappointed’ if the Convention were to be ‘routinely 
paraded in cases of this nature as makeweight grounds of appeal’.2 Nevertheless he did anticipate 
that the Court of Appeal would be required to make general rulings in relation to particular 
articles of the Convention. Indeed, in an earlier case -  Re W (Contact application: procedure)3- 
the judge had predicted that the Convention would be used in the context of grandparent contact 
disputes.  
 
It is, then, apparently an issue, on both sides of the Atlantic, whether rights deriving from 
constitutional codes and rights conventions can, and should, be used (successfully) in disputes 
between parents and extended family members about the children of the family. This issue has 
become more important given that the role of the extended family is an area of growing policy 
interest in both countries, not least because of the political need to attract the ‘grey’ vote. In the 
UK, media interest appears to have been stimulated by the publication of a government 
consultation paper, Supporting Families (Home Office, 1998).  
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1. SUPPORTING THE FAMILY 
Supporting Families, prepared by a specially constituted Ministerial Group on the Family, asserts 
that the government, ‘recognising the role of the wider family, and particularly grandparents’ 
(Home Office, 1998: para 1.45), plans to cast them as key players in initiatives to support ‘the 
family’ and to strengthen communities.  In an effort to counter the  tendency for the interests and 
contributions of extended family members to be  ‘marginalised’ by service providers, the 
government states its intention to introduce policies -  in education, social services, housing and 
health - that will promote and facilitate ‘a positive role’ for  ‘grandparents - and other relatives  
... in their families’  (para 1.60).  
 
Yet while the document stresses the importance of grandparents, that importance is presented as 
lying primarily in the contribution they might make to the stability and survival of the 
‘traditional’ or nuclear family consisting only of parent(s) and child(ren).4 Grandparents, 
volunteer substitute grandparents and other extended family members  will be a  multi-faceted 
resource: they will bridge the gaps between families and schools and families and communities, 
will  look after related children on behalf of social services, will be a source of ‘social and 
cultural history’ (1998: 18-19)  to give the community roots, will act as mentors ‘for young 
people whose parents are not able to provide a stable and supportive home environment’ (1998: 
16-17),  and will  be a ready source of help to their families living nearby.5 The  emphasis is, 
then, on kin as a practical resource and as a vehicle for transmitting the values and knowledge 
seen as necessary for the stability of communities through the raising of well-adjusted and 
responsible citizens.6  In so far as legislation may ensue, it will encourage professionals to use 
the extended family to provide benefits for children and their parents at home, at school and in 
the community. 
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What the document does not address is the situation inherent in Troxel v Granville and Re W, 
where, most commonly after the breakdown of the parents’ relationship, there is conflict between 
the nuclear and the extended family and the involvement of  extended family members is 
unwanted. The document does not  propose new remedies for those who feel excluded.  Nor does 
it challenge the assumption that ‘family’ equals ‘parent(s) plus child(ren)’. It is likely to be 
limited in effect, therefore, in comparison with changes introduced in other jurisdictions such as 
South Africa7 and Macedonia,8 for example, where the law has gone some way towards 
extending the concept of the ‘family’.   
 
2. EXCLUDING FAMILY 
Whilst exclusion from the nuclear family may affect a variety of extended family members it is 
grandparents - on both sides of the Atlantic - who have been most vocal in articulating their 
exclusion as a  problem and who have set up pressure groups to seek redress, notably the 
Grandparents Federation and Age Concern in the UK. Not only is the cohort of grandparents 
growing in numbers,9 its members also appear to be experiencing more difficulty in maintaining 
relationships with their grandchildren,10 partly because of the increased incidence of divorce. In 
the UK the Grandparent Federation has recently highlighted problems in relation to the operation 
of both public and private family law.  
 
In regard to public law, they have criticised an apparent reluctance by social services to promote 
contact with grandchildren in care or to consider grandparent fostering of such grandchildren. 
They have compiled and published collections of personal stories from grandparents who have 
been excluded by social services from the lives of their grandchildren (Tingle, undated) and from 
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grandparents who have been looking after their grandchildren but have failed to receive 
sufficient emotional or financial support from social services (Grandparents Federation, 
undated).  That problem is addressed in Supporting Families  in so far as the paper draws 
attention to the fact that a grandparent ‘may provide a very effective placement’ for a child 
‘looked after’ by social services  and invites views on ‘best practice for grandparents as foster 
carers’. (Home Office, 1998: 18-19).  And already, according to the findings of one research 
project, placements with grandparents are the most common extended family placements.11  
 
It is the other main issue highlighted by the Grandparents Federation that is the one with which 
we are primarily concerned.This is the perception that many grandparents are denied contact 
with their grandchildren by parents and that they are prejudiced within the private law arena by 
the fact that they have no special status. A study exploring the experiences of members of the 
Grandparents Federation (Drew and Smith, 1999) reports problems such as the cost of legal 
proceedings and the detrimental impact of litigation on the family as impediments to the use of 
the courts. But there were also grandparents who complained about what they regarded as 
unfairness in the determination of contact disputes. Also, there were complaints about the 
reluctance of the judiciary to enforce those contact orders that are granted. Part of the difficulties 
experienced by grandparents, say the researchers, stems from the fact that the caretaking parent  
is ‘generally believed by the courts to ... be the best judge of what is in the best interests of the 
child’ and the court will ‘accept this parent’s recommendation to allow the child to see their 
grandparent or not’ (1999: 212).  
 
Of course, interviewees affiliated to a grandparents’ pressure group are likely to be those 
experiencing the most severe kinds of difficulties and, moreover, the research gives no indication 
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of rates of success among those grandparents in the sample who did go to law to seek contact 
orders.12 Nevertheless, the Grandparents Federation believes the extent of dissatisfaction with 
the operation of the provisions in the Children Act 198913 is significant. Their director of policy 
has been reported as asserting that grandparents have few rights and that the organisation is 
seeking a change in the UK’s domestic legislation, notably to give a right to apply without 
leave.14 In the light of available research, however, it is difficult to establish how the ‘rights’ 
already available under the Children Act 1989 are operating in practice in relation to 
grandparents. 
 
The Children Act 1989 
In the UK, lobbying in the 1980s led to the  inclusion of  provisions to widen access to the courts 
by ‘non-parents’.15 At the same time, grandparents lost any preferential legal status16 and must 
apply to the court, under section 10(9) of the Act, for leave to apply for section 8 orders (for 
contact and residence, inter alia).  Of the three relevant criteria, it was believed that the second 
criterion17 -   ‘the applicant’s connection with the child’ (section 10(9)(b)) -  in particular would 
lead to courts giving  grandparents ‘special consideration’ (Douglas and Lowe, 1990: 105), a 
view shared by  the Lord Chancellor and the Minister of Health at the time of the passage of the 
Act.18 Whether this has occurred is not clear. On the one hand there is judicial acceptance of the 
idea that contact with grandparents is normally in the best interests of the child. For example, in 
Re W(Contact: Application by Grandparent), Hollis J asserted that  grandparents ‘have a very 
great place to play in the life of children, particularly young children ... This influence can be 
extremely beneficial to children, provided it is exercised with care and not too frequently’.19 On 
the other hand, whilst ‘it can be in the best interests of a child to maintain contact with 
grandparents, even if there is parental opposition’,20 there is evidence that this is not (always) the 
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judicial approach.  
 
Because of a current dearth of empirical data on the operation of the relevant statutory  
provisions, one can only review reported cases in relation to the main criticisms made by the 
Grandparents’ Federation. First, in relation to seeking leave to apply,  the applicant must have 
‘an arguable case’ (Hayes and Williams, 1999: 94-5). Re A and W21 makes it clear that, although 
the child’s welfare is not paramount in applications for leave,22 courts must engage in 
assessments of the child’s welfare23 in establishing whether the grounds for leave have been 
satisfied. In this exercise the third criterion - ‘any risk there might be of that proposed application 
disrupting the child’s life to such an extent that he would be harmed by it’ (section 10(9)(c))  - 
may carry most weight, even though the definition of ‘harm’ is the restrictive one contained in 
section 31(9) of the Children Act 1989.24 Certainly, in one reported case in the Family 
Division,25 the judge dismissed an appeal against the decision of a stipendiary magistrate who 
had refused leave because of the ‘total opposition’ of the parents to the child’s contact with her 
paternal grandmother.      
 
The second set of Grandparent Federation criticisms focuses on the substantive hearing where 
grandparents face a major difficulty because there is no presumption in English case law (as 
there is in effect in relation to natural parents) that contact should be awarded. Currently 
grandparents have to show grounds for contact;26 they are not in a ‘special position’27 and the  
hearing will focus on the welfare of the child.28 However, it is again unclear how ‘best interests’ 
tend to be  constructed when applications under sections 8 and  10 are precipitated by parental 
opposition to such contact. In In Re S (Contact: Grandparents),29 Wall J (as he then was) both 
found the mother’s hostility to be unreasonable and  endorsed the views of a clinical 
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psychologist that the child was likely to suffer ‘significant harm’ if contact were not re-
established.30 Other reported cases, while relatively small in number, suggest that judges may be 
hesitant to award contact in the face of parental opposition and family conflict31 or, perhaps, in 
cases where there has been little contact in the past.32  Certainly Butler-Sloss LJ (now President 
of the Family Division) was clear in Re A that the judge at first instance was right to deny 
grandparent contact ‘at this stage’ on account of intra-family conflict because time was needed 
before contact would be possible: ‘[B]ecause the grown ups cannot get on he cannot see the other 
family. He is entitled to both families but it requires the grown-ups to grow up ... and make it 
possible for this little boy to move between the two families’.33   
 
What limited evidence there is suggests that the judiciary is ambivalent about grandparent 
contact though in reported cases on residence34 there is a much clearer prioritisation of children’s 
relationships with parents over those with grandparents. Moreover, it appears that this 
ambivalence may be shared by professionals involved in contact disputes.  A decade ago it was 
found that mediators and divorce court welfare officers considered grandparent-grandchild 
contact valuable but rarely actively promoted it because of concerns about ‘interfering’ 
grandparents and about creating intra-family conflict (Kaganas and Piper, 1990). More recent  
research conducted by one of us suggests that solicitors are also ambivalent in relation to 
grandparent involvement. Of thirty-six solicitors interviewed,  only three said they `always’ 
asked new divorce clients about grandparent contact and while  the remaining solicitors 
‘sometimes’ asked about this issue, only two said they asked because it was `in the child’s best 
interests’ whereas four solicitors expressed negative views about grandparents. They said that 
hostile grandparents `can brainwash children’,  that grandparents `became polarised’ and that, 
where both sets of grandparents were closely involved, it `can make things a lot worse’.35   
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Whilst we do not know what advice solicitors are now giving members of extended families who 
wish to institute contact proceedings, we do know that very few such relatives litigate: Bailey-
Harris et al found that out of 345 cases in their sample, only 6% involved applications from 
grandparents and 4% from others (1998: 18). Given Drew and Smith’s findings (1999: 205) and 
what we know of judical and professional thinking, it is probable that grandparents are not being 
encouraged to use what rights they already have and that stronger legal rights may therefore 
make little difference in practice. Nevertheless, lobbying on behalf of grandparents has taken the 
form of demands for greater rights. 
 
3. BETTER RIGHTS BASED REMEDIES? 
It has now been suggested that the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) will have profound 
implications for families36 and, specifically, might prove ‘helpful to those wishing to challenge 
the ways that courts and local authorities deal with ... care proceedings, adoption, the rights of 
other relatives to access to the child (and vice versa)’ (Wadham and Mountfield, 1999: 97). It 
might be seen as potentially opening up new avenues for grandparents in the UK to seek redress. 
Yet while this legislation might be a new resource for grandparents, it might equally prove useful 
for parents. This potential is highlighted by cases such as Troxel v Granville in the USA where 
challenges have been mounted against those statutes which give  grandparents standing to apply 
for access without any preconditions such as death or divorce of the parent(s).37  
 
The HRA  incorporates into the domestic law of the UK most of the rights and liberties enshrined 
in the European Convention on Human Rights. Among these is the right to respect for private 
and family life and the prohibition against unwarranted interference with these rights embodied 
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in Art 8.  The question which then arises is  whether - and how - rights might make a difference 
if grandparents were to  seek to rely in domestic courts on their right to family life in order to 
gain or maintain contact with their grandchildren. Given that the current law on contact places 
the child’s best interests at the centre of decision-making, will rights ‘work’ to enhance 
grandparent status and to facilitate success in contact disputes? Even if parents - or children - do 
not invoke the same rights to resist such efforts, will rights prevail over constructions of the 
child’s best interests that currently appear to disadvantage grandparents? 
 
‘Rights v welfare’ 
Apparent in academic commentary on the HRA is an implicit or explicit assumption that there is 
a tension between a welfare and a rights based approach. An article - entitled ‘The Human Rights 
Act and the welfare principle in family law - conflicting or complementary?’ (Herring, 1999a)38 
- refers to the tension ‘between the wish to promote the welfare of the child and the concern to 
protect the rights of family members’ and argues that, ‘in the light of the Human Rights Act and 
the centrality of the welfare principle in the Children Act, the courts are going to be forced to 
develop some kind of synthesis between the two approaches’ (1999a: 224). Elsewhere, it has 
been suggested that European case law recognising adults’ independent rights to family life  
makes it difficult ‘to rely on the child-centred conceptualisation of contact under the Children 
Act’ (Bainham, 1995:258). Furthermore, a  text on the HRA also summarises the approach under 
the Convention as ‘different from that adopted by English law’, and asserts that ‘Article 8 does 
not support the notion that paramountcy is to be given to the interests of the child’ (Swindells et 
al, 1998: para3.154). 
 
This apparent resurgence of a ‘rights v welfare’ paradigm is surprising, given theoretical 
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critiques of welfare and rights-based ‘justice’ as amorphous concepts with meanings contingent 
on context,39 the development of  theories which reconceptualise welfare and justice as 
constructs within self-referential systems,40 and the emergence of practices of  restorative justice 
and family mediation which transcend or bypass notions of welfare and rights. We now have a 
situation where  a growing reification of inter-disciplinarity within the family justice system and 
the increasing importance of particular shared understandings of what should count as the best 
interests of the child have led to a corresponding reluctance by legal professionals to use legal 
remedies and rights. Conversely, advocates of children’s rights take an inherently  protectionist, 
welfare stance.41
 
Perhaps the current assumption that a polarity exists is understandable, given that the rights-
based approach of the HRA -  framed as it is within the libertarian tradition represented by the 
European Convention on Human Rights - is a completely new area of practice and study for 
many academics and professionals. The assumption that the new must also be different is 
fortified by some of the comments being made  in  recent texts. For example, Sedley LJ. in his 
‘Foreword’ to a book on human rights law (Starmer, 1999) writes of the need ‘for courts and 
lawyers to begin to acquire a new mindset’ if the HRA is to be ‘more than window-dressing’.42
 
However, the predicted clash between rights and welfare under the HRA may never materialise, 
at least not within the sphere of private family law.43 The rights enshrined in the European 
Convention, and so too in the HRA, are designed primarily to protect individual liberties against 
the depredations of an oppressive state, while also seeking to ensure that the state provides 
positive safeguards for those liberties. Their significance in resolving private family disputes is 
open to some doubt. The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (‘the Court’) and 
 
 11 
the (recently abolished) European Commission, we shall argue, neither polarises rights and 
welfare nor significantly extends the notion of ‘the family’. 
 
4. GRANDPARENTS AND ‘FAMILY LIFE’ 
The crucial article for our purposes is Article 8 of the ECHR which provides: 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in 
the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well being of the country, 
for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
 
Whilst the precise nature of the rights protected under Art 8 has never been articulated,44 the 
Court has ruled that Art 8 does impose a positive obligation on the State: ‘it must act in a manner 
calculated to allow those concerned to lead a normal family life’.45 A claim that legislation 
should accord special status to particular categories of relatives such as grandparents would fall 
under Art 8(1) while the actions of state bodies that impede the exercise of the right to family life 
would fall under Art 8(2). 
 
The first stage in determining in any particular case whether there has been a contravention of 
Art 8 is to decide whether the person alleging violation - in our case a grandparent - has a right to 
family life within the meaning of the Convention. It is well established that a right to family life 
exists between biological parents and their children - whether or not the parents are married.46 
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The Court has said, for example, that, in the case of married or cohabiting parents, the birth of a 
child immediately gives rise to a family bond amounting to family life (although the tie may be 
broken by subsequent events).47  The Court has also held that ‘the mutual enjoyment by parent 
and child of each other’s company constitutes a fundamental element of family life’.48  
 
However, it is more difficult to show that the right to family life of either grandparents or 
grandchildren encompasses the maintainance of the relationship between them. The  Court held, 
in the Marckx case, that ‘ “family life”, within the meaning of Article 8, includes at least the ties 
between near relatives, for instance, those between grandparents and grandchildren, since such 
relatives may play a considerable part in family life’.49 The ‘family life’ referred to in the 
Convention, said the Court, embraces ‘social, moral or cultural relations’ as well as interests ‘of 
a material kind’ such as inheritance rights.50 But, as Liddy points out (1998: 19), when it comes 
to disputes regarding the relationships between individuals, such as those between grandparents 
and parents over children, as opposed to issues relating to property or inheritance, no assumption 
is made that family life exists automatically as a function of blood ties; the Commission has 
interpreted and applied the Marckx case restrictively. There must be evidence of some form of 
actual family life between grandparents and grandchildren; to establish family life, close 
relatives have to show a close link in the nature of a relationship of dependency.51 It  has 
accordingly been held that in the case of a grandparent who has taken on the care of a grandchild, 
the requirements of ‘family life’ are satisfied.52 A close relationship created by frequent contact 
also suffices.53  
 
Even if such a relationship is established, however, the issue of parental opposition is  potentially 
fatal to an application because of the Court’s stance on parental authority. As Harris et al 
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observe, ‘[t]he positions of members of a family with respect to one another are not identical. In 
particular, the idea of family life acknowledges some authority of parents over young children’ 
(1995:316). So, for example, in Nielsen v Denmark54 the Court affirmed that the exercise of 
parental rights, including the authority to decide where the child should live and what constraints 
might be put on his or her liberty, ‘constitutes a fundamental element of family life’.55  
Reviewing the case law, Harris et al suggest that it raises implicitly the possibility that parents 
are deemed to have the ‘right to control the personal relationships ... of their children’ (1995: 
317).56  
 
Two cases57 dealing with access to children in local authority care also affirm parental authority, 
stating that access by grandparents to grandchildren is normally at the discretion of parents. 
However, as against the local authority, denial to the grandparent of ‘the reasonable access 
necessary to preserve a normal grandparent-grandchild relationship’58 could constitute 
interference with family life. These cases could be interpreted as suggesting that ‘normal’ ties 
between grandparents and grandchildren are only those that meet with parental approval; the 
right to family life does not include the right to thwart parental authority. Alternatively, and in 
the light of the clear view59 that grandparents’ rights are inferior to those of parents, a more 
plausible interpretation might be that grandparents’ rights would carry less weight than those of 
parents at the second stage of the decision-making process. 
 
5. JUSTIFYING (NON-)INTERFERENCE 
Once the existence of the right has been established, the second stage involves a determination of 
whether that right has been violated, either by a failure to respect it (Art 8(1)) or by interference 
with it (Art 8(2)). If it is found that there has been interference, it will then have to be decided 
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whether that interference is justified. This it will be if it is ‘in accordance with the law’, in 
pursuance of a ‘legitimate aim’ and ‘necessary in a democratic society’ (Liddy, 1998: 16). Case 
law of the Court and the Commission states that the notion of necessity should be read as 
indicating that interference is justifed if it corresponds to a ‘pressing social need’ and if it is 
‘proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued’.60 This doctrine of proportionality is used to ensure 
that a ‘measure imposes no greater restriction upon a Convention right than is absolutely 
necessary to achieve its objectives’ (Lord Irvine of Lairg, 1998: 233). Even if a grandparent, 
then, is able to establish a right to family life with his or her grandchildren, the Court, in 
proceeding to the next step, may find either that there has been no interference with this right or 
that interference is justified.The right to protection against interference is qualified and any 
consideration or prioritisation of the welfare of the child can easily be interpreted as being 
consistent with the protection of the child’s health. The decisions of the Commission and the 
Court reveal that they consider that the legitimate aim of protecting the  health and rights of 
others extends to the aim of safeguarding the welfare of a child, including the emotional and 
psychological well-being of that child.61  
 
For example, in Johansen v Norway62 the Court referred to the need to strike ‘a fair balance’ 
between the interests of the parents and the child. In doing so, it said, ‘the court will attach 
particular importance to the best interests of the child, which depending on their nature and 
seriousness may override those of the parent. In particular ... the parent cannot be entitled under 
Art 8 of the Convention to have such measures taken as would harm the child’s health and 
development’. Similarly, the Court in Hokkanen v Finland63 stated that although a parent might 
have custody and access rights, ‘Where contacts with the parent might appear to threaten [the 
child’s] interests or interfere with those rights, it is for the national authorities to strike a fair 
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balance between them’.64  Further, it seems that the interests of the community as a whole must 
also be put in the scales.65  
 
In K and T v Finland 66 the court made it clear that ‘consideration of what is in the best interest 
of the child is in every case of crucial importance.  And in deciding that restrictions on access did 
not violate Art.8, the court reached its findings ‘in the light of the present-day interests of the 
children’ .67   In addition, the Court indicated in Glaser v UK ,68 that while Art.8 creates 
obligations to take measures to reunite families, this obligation is not absolute; the rights and 
freedom of all concerned must be taken into account and, in particular, the best interests and 
rights of the child. Most significantly, perhaps, is the fact that a reading of Hokkanen suggests 
that, of all the interests weighed in the balance, those of the child were accorded priority, even to 
the extent that her wishes were determinative.The Court did decide that the parent’s rights had 
been infringed by the failure of the authorities to enforce access but this finding was made in the 
context of a Court of Appeal judgment that contact with the applicant was in the child’s best 
interests.69 But when the child grew mature enough for her wishes to be taken into account and 
articulated, her antipathy towards access, the court said, meant it was no longer a violation of Art 
8 to fail to enforce it. Also, the Court had no hesitation in finding that a transfer of custody to the 
grandparents was ‘necessary in a democratic society’ in the light of expert opinion pointing to 
the ‘length of the girl’s stay with [them], her strong attachment to them and her feeling that their 
home was her own’70.  
 
Despite, therefore, the rights-based approach of the Convention and the need to balance 
conflicting rights, in practice the tendency of the Court has been to find interference with Art 8 
rights legitimate provided the interference has been consistent with the child’s welfare.The cases 
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where interference has been found to be contrary to Art 8 have tended to involve a failure by 
child welfare authorities, absent any justification in terms of child welfare,71 to consult parents or 
a failure to give effect to court orders made in the child’s interests.72 Whilst, therefore, the 
requirement that grandparents seek leave before applying for a section 8 order under the Children 
Act 1989 could be challenged under Art 8, such a challenge could well fail: the requirement 
could be seen as consistent with the need to consider the rights of the nuclear family and the 
welfare of the child. The mechanism of requiring leave is almost certainly proportionate to a 
legitimate aim of identifying meritorious claims. In McMichael v United Kingdom73 the Court 
held that a statutory mechanism for for the purpose of identifying meritorious fathers who might 
then be accorded parental rights was justified by the legitimate aim of protecting the rights of 
mothers and children.74 In addition this mechanism respected the principle of proportionality. 
 
Whether the leave requirement contravenes Art 6 is also open to question. It appears that the 
right of access to a court is not absolute (Swindells et al, 1999: para 8.48).  Limitations in pursuit 
of a legitimate aim, which satisfy  the proportionality test and which do not impair the very 
essence of the right may be compatible with Art 6.75  
 
A challenge to the leave requirement, a claim by grandparents for special statutory status or a 
claim by parents that grandparents should not statutorily be permitted to seek contact would have 
to be taken to Strasbourg. Direct challenges to legislation do not fall within the purview of the 
Human Rights Act 1998, with which we are primarily concerned, and it is to this statute that we 
now turn. 
 
6. THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998 
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When the HRA is implemented, it will be unlawful76 for a public authority to act in a way that is 
incompatible with a Convention right77 unless, as a result of the provisions of primary 
legislation, it could not have acted differently.78 The courts have a duty ‘[s]o far as it is possible 
to do so’,79  to interpret legislation in a way that is compatible with the Convention. And since 
the court is itself a public authority,80 it appears likely that the wording of the statute, coupled 
with the doctrine of ‘horizontal effect’, will  be thought to require courts, in private disputes, also 
to develop the common law in accordance with the principles of the Convention (Laws, 1998: 
263).81 This will affect all cases, whether in public or private law, against private individuals or 
public authorities, irrespective of whether the court is concerned with statutory construction, a 
declaration of common law or the exercise of judicial discretion (Wadham and Mountfield, 1999: 
27).82 In the event of an unlawful act by a court of first instance, a litigant’s remedy under 
section 9 lies in an appeal or judicial review (Wadham and Mountfield, 1999: 46). Where it is not 
possible to interpret legislation in accordance with the Convention, under section 4(2), a superior 
court may make a ‘declaration of incompatibility’.  
 
Any court or tribunal determining a question that has arisen in connection with a Convention 
right must take into account the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, of the 
Commission and  of the Council of Ministers.83 It is not entirely clear, however, whether this 
jurisprudence will be imported wholesale 84 because the European decisions are not intended to 
be binding on domestic courts.85 Nevertheless, it appears to be likely that courts will use 
concepts such as ‘pressing social need’ and the doctrine of proportionality,  particularly in cases 
involving conflicting claims of right (Laws, 1998: 258, 262 and 265). 
 
So, to return to the focus of this article,  might it be possible for members of the extended family 
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such as grandparents in dispute over contact, relying on European jurisprudence, to argue, 
provided they have had a close relationship with their grandchildren, that their right to family life 
encompasses contact?86  
 
Contact and family life 
There are three different scenarios that could arise87 if the link between grandparents and child is 
found to fall within the purview of family life. First, it could be argued by the grandparent, or 
child, that the absence of a presumption that contact is in children’s best interests constitutes a 
failure to respect family life. This possibility was canvassed by Wilson J in Re W (Contact 
Application: Procedure): ‘I anticipate that, when the Human Rights Act 1998 comes into force, it 
will be argued that a child’s respect for his or her family life under Art 8 of the Convention 
requires the absence of such a presumption in the case of a grandparent to be revisited’.88 The 
difficulty with this argument would be, perhaps, that it presupposes that in a significant majority 
of cases,89 grandparent contact is indeed in children’s best interests, a contention that has 
hitherto not been substantiated; available research offers qualified support for grandparent 
contact.90  
 
Second, grandparents could argue that for a court to refuse leave to apply for contact or to refuse 
contact itself constitutes an unlawful act.91 Section 3 of the HRA, which obliges courts to 
interpret legislation, where possible, in conformity with Convention rights has been described as 
‘a deeply mysterious provision posing various problems of interpretation’ (Marshall, 1998: 167). 
It can probably be assumed that it will be read as requiring courts to assign a meaning to 
statutory provisions that best upholds Convention rights. Nevertheless its application to section 
10 of the  Children Act 1989 and to disputes over Children Act section 8 orders remains 
 
 19 
problematic.  
 
As noted above, applications for leave to apply for section 8 orders must be decided in 
accordance with the statutory criteria embodied in s10(9) coupled with the welfare checklist in 
s1(3) though the child’s welfare, it appears,  is not the paramount consideration.92  Since neither 
s1(3) nor s10(9) is  exhaustive, the court might be able to read into them a duty to consider the 
rights to family life of the various family members: grandparents, parents and children.93 The 
court in such a situation could, however, be confronted with a conflict of rights which would, it 
seems, have to be resolved by invoking the doctrine of proportionality94 and attempting to strike 
a fair balance. This could help to justify a decision to allow leave where, for example, it would 
result in some disruption for the parents but the nature of the relationship between grandparent 
and grandchild is close; it could be argued that the legitimate aim of safeguarding a child’s rights 
or the child’s mental, emotional or physical ‘health’95 or welfare requires this incursion into 
parental rights. Conversely, it could be argued in a case where the disruption to the parents is 
great, that refusal of leave satisfies the proportionality test in the pursuit of the legitimate aim of 
safeguarding the rights of the child and parents as well as the child’s health or welfare which, it 
could be contended, is best served by protecting the nuclear family from interference.96
 
When it comes to deciding substantive disputes about contact, as opposed to leave, the court, it 
seems, has less leeway. It must apply the Children Act 1989 checklist and has a statutory 
obligation to make the child’s welfare paramount.97 The effect of the paramountcy principle is 
summed up in the oft quoted words of Lord Mac Dermott in J v C.98 The statutory formula, he 
said: 
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connote[s] a process whereby, when all the relevant facts, relationships, claims and 
wishes of parents, risks, choices and other circumstances are taken into account and 
weighed, the course to be followed will be that which is most in the interests of the 
child’s welfare as that term has now to be understood. That is the ... paramount 
consideration because it rules upon or determines the course to be followed. 
 
On the face of it, we do have here a clear ‘rights v welfare’ clash: the paramountcy principle 
could  be said to be inconsistent with Art 8 of the Convention because it automatically renders 
the rights claims of the adults concerned subservient to the welfare of children and so might 
preclude the attainment of a ‘fair balance’.99 Arguably,  it would not, therefore, be possible for a 
court to read section 1 of the Children Act to give effect to either parents’ or grandparents’ rights 
to family life. This, almost certainly, would be the view of Swindells et al who question ‘how 
parental rights can be subordinated to the interest of the child under the welfare paramountcy 
test’ in the light of Convention law (1998: para 8.24), a view that would, arguably, necessitate a 
declaration of incompatibility.100  Yet the paramountcy principle could well be seen as necessary 
in a democratic society for the purpose of achieving a legitimate aim, that of protecting the 
health,101 and even the rights, of children, both because of  their vulnerability  and because their 
well-adjustment is crucial to the future of society. A fair balance, it seems, requires the 
consideration of harm to children. And, like the decisions of the European Court, domestic courts 
are, it could be said, justified in allowing children’s interests to tip the balance.102  
 
A similar approach could be adopted in addressing the third scenario. It could be argued that a 
failure by a court to enforce an existing contact order through the mechanism of contempt 
proceedings is unlawful. This might be countered with the contention that committal 
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proceedings, with the possible outcome of imprisonment, would lead to interference with the 
family life of parents and children and that, on balance, these rights or interests outweigh those 
of grandparents. And certainly the ECHR has taken the view that coercive measures to enforce 
contact orders should be circumspectly applied.103  The Court of Appeal in this jurisdiction has 
indicated, in the context of a dispute between parents, that committal should be seen only as a 
last resort: the power ‘exists only to serve the ends of justice and ultimately the crucial 
consideration remains what the interests of justice in the broadest sense demand, giving p roper 
weight to the interests of the children even if their welfare is not strictly the paramount 
consideration’.104  Nor did the public administration of justice require committal in cases heard 
in chambers.105 In the light of the negative effect committal of the mother would have on the 
children and on their relationship with their absent father, the court struck out the committal 
application. Thus it is apparent that, even when not paramount, children’s interests may tip the 
balance, a result that is also consistent with European jurisprudence. 
 
7. A ‘WIN’ FOR WELFARE? 
The domestic courts have already turned their attention to the relationship between the 
paramountcy principle and the rights conferred by Art 8. In Dawson v Wearmouth,106  Lord 
Hobhouse of Woodborough said that nothing in the Convention requires the courts to act 
otherwise than in accordance with the interests of the child. The courts do recognise the 
existence of independent parental rights: in Re J (Specific Issue Orders: Muslim Upbringing and 
Circumcision),107 Wall J, in the context of Art 9 of the Convention, accepted that parents have 
rights under it108 and in Re KD (A Minor)(Ward: Termination of Access),109 Lord Oliver 
accepted that a parent has a ‘substantive right of access to his child’. Nevertheless Lord Oliver 
asserted that this is a ‘right which will always be overborne if the interests of the child so 
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dictate’.110  To quote him at length: 
 
I do not, for my part, discern any conflict between the propositions laid down ... in J v C 
and the pronouncements of the European Court of Human Rights in relation to the 
natural parents’ [sic] right of access to her child. Such conflict as exists is, I think, 
semantic only and lies only in differing ways of giving expression to the single common 
concept that the natural bond and relationship between parent and child gives rise to 
universally recognised norms which ought not to be gratuitously interfered with and 
which, if interfered with at all, ought to be so only if the welfare of the child dictates it. 
.... Parenthood, in most civilised societies, is generally conceived of as conferring on 
parents the exclusive privilege of ordering, within the family, the upbringing of children 
of tender age, with all that entails.That is a privilege which, if interfered with without 
authority, would be protected by the courts, but it is a privilege circumscibed by many 
limitations .... When the jurisdiction of the court is invoked for the protection of the child 
the parental privileges do not terminate. They do, however, become immediately 
subservient to the paramount consideration which the court has always in mind, that is to 
say the welfare of the child.111  
 
This approach was endorsed by Ward LJ in Re P112 but Herring (1999a) contends that Lord 
Oliver was wrong to characterise the difference between the two approaches as merely semantic; 
the nature of the questions asked under each as well as the evidence required differs.113 
However, given the willingness of the European institutions to prioritise children’s welfare, the 
jurisprudence of those institutions is not clearly contradicted by the paramountcy principle. Even 
in W v United Kingdom (Denial of access to children taken into public care)114 the European 
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Court of Human Rights, while asserting that parents’ rights are independent of children’s 
interests, appeared to be able to reconcile this principle with the paramountcy of children’s 
welfare. Fortin (1999b) suggests that, while the rights of a party might be infringed by a decision 
concerning contact, as long as the decision is made in the child’s best interests, it would 
automatically comply with Art 8(2).115     
 
It appears that the UK judiciary is doing all that it can to keep welfare paramount. However a 
recent decision of the Court of Appeal (R v Secretary of State for Home Department Ex Parte 
Gangadeen: R v Secretary of State for Home Department Ex Parte Khan)116 has, according to 
Swindells et al (1999: para 3.153), thrown into doubt the compatibility of the paramountcy 
principle with Art 8. Reviewing the decisions of the Commission and the European Court, the 
Court of Appeal concluded that both bodies approach the application of Art 8 ‘as a 
straightforward balancing exercise, in which the scales start even...; thus they do not support the 
notion that paramountcy is to be given to the interests of the child’.117  Yet this approach might 
be explained by the fact that this case, and those European authorities118 cited by the court, all 
involved immigration disputes where the rights and interests of the individuals concerned were 
weighed against the right of the state ‘to control the entry of non-nationals into its territory’.119 
As Swinton Thomas LJ stated in Gangadeen, ‘[i]n the field of immigration, particularly 
decisions relating to deportation, the interests of the child are not, and cannot, be paramount or 
primary ... If it were otherwise, it would be difficult ever to make a deportation decision in 
relation to a child’.120  
 
The Ganagadeen decision leaves open, therefore, the possibility that, while Art 8 does not 
support the application of the paramountcy principle in immigration cases where the state has a 
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significant interest, it does not preclude the application of the principle in cases involving private 
disputes about children’s upbringing. That being so, the incorporation of Art 8 into domestic law 
will, we suggest, make little difference in relation to grandparent contact disputes. The 
jurisprudence of the ECHR emphasises the nuclear family and the rights of parents to make 
decisions. Whilst the involved grandparent - those, for instance who have passed the ECHR 
‘actual family relationship test’ - may have rights, these, it seems, are likely to be superseded by 
the  superior rights of parents. What can tip the balance is the placing in the scales of  the child’s 
rights and welfare. So, what we are left with is a paradox. On the one hand, the HRA appears to 
make rights-talk central to family law. On the other hand, as we have seen, while rights hover in 
the background, courts filter these through the concept of welfare. 
 
8. FIT PARENTS DECIDE 
Our conclusion that rights deriving from the ECHR will not lead to new remedies for 
grandparents or to different conceptions of the family should come as no surprise, given the 
Troxel v Granville decision with which we began. This recent Supreme Court decision also 
highlights the importance accorded to the parents’ interpretation of the child’s best interests. The 
majority of the Supreme Court found that the application of  s26.10.160(3) of the Washington 
Revised Code violated the mother’s due process right under the Fourteenth Amendment - as 
decided in Meyer v Nebraska 67 L Ed 390 (1922)121 - to make decisions concerning the care, 
custody and control of her daughter.  
 
The statutory provision in question permitted ‘any person’ to petition for visitation rights at ‘any 
time’ and authorised the court to grant visitation wherever it  served the best interests of the 
child.  The Supreme Court affirmed that it was ‘breathtakingly broad’, allowing any third party 
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to instigate a state-court review in which ‘a parent’s decision that visitation would not be in the 
child’s best interest is accorded no deference’. As O’Connor, J went on to explain, ‘in practical 
effect, in the State of Washington a court [could] disregard and overturn any decision by a fit 
custodial parent ... based solely on the judge’s determination of the child’s best interests’; that 
could lead to the infringement of a parent’s right, given the presumption, explained in Parham, 
that ‘the natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children’,122 
except when the parent is judged to be unfit.123 The visitation provision as applied was 
unconstitutional. 
 
This could be seen as a victory for parental rights over either the welfare of the child or the rights 
of grandparents: Thomas, J., concurring, said that the case had been resolved ‘by this Court’s 
recognition of a fundamental right of parents’ and Souter, J. added that there was no need to 
consider ‘the precise scope of the parent’s right or its necessary protections’.  The mechanism 
used, however, was the reconstructing of parental autonomy rights as welfare: the court cites 
cases where the presumption was established that  visitation is not in the child’s best interests if 
parents oppose visitation.124 The judgement also leaves many questions unanswered because the 
court saw no need  to consider 
 
‘whether the Due Process Clause requires all non-parental visitation statutes to include a 
showing of harm or potential harm to the child as a condition precedent to granting 
visitation. We do not, and need not, define today the precise scope of the parental due 
process right in the visitation context.... because much state-court adjudication in this 
context occurs on a case-by-case basis, we would be hesitant to hold that specific 
nonparental visitation statutes violate the Due Process Clause as a per se matter.’      
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In effect the court refused to rule on how much harm to the child would be needed to counter-
balance the weight given to parental decision-making as a factor in the child’s best interests. 
Previous decisions by State courts are, then, still influential but, again, divided in their approach. 
On the one hand, a majority of the Kentucky court in King v King Ky. affirmed the existence of 
grandparents’ ‘fundamental rights’125 and then went on to consider welfare. It upheld the 
constitutionality of the Kentucky grandparent visitation statute apparently because, since contact 
would promote social stability and, more importantly, the welfare of grandparents and 
grandchildren,126 the state had a legitimate interest in allowing it. In contrast, the Tennessee 
Supreme Court held that the  visitation statute violated the Tennessee Constitution and refused 
even to entertain the question of whether grandparent vistation might be in the best interests of 
children absent ‘substantial danger of harm to the child’.127
 
That the Supreme Court had previously expanded the concept of family privacy to embrace 
grandparents and grandchildren - on the basis of participation ‘in the duties and the satisfactions 
of a common home’128 so that generally grandparents have to show a shared household for the 
purposes of ‘mutual sustenance’129 - is, then, not enough.   Again, in the USA as in Europe, what 
is needed for success is a construction of welfare that gives significant weight to the benefits of 
contact. 
 
9. CONCLUSION 
It seems to us that the rights-talk generated by the HRA will not alone have the effect of 
encouraging the excluded extended family to seek involvement in children’s lives or the nuclear 
family to accept it. Nor, it seems, will the courts be moved either to allow rights to trump130 
welfare or to allow parental authority easily to be undermined by third parties. In a society where 
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the paramountcy principle is hailed as the ‘golden thread’ that runs through its  legisation dealing 
with children, where political and legal rhetoric has for decades proclaimed the overriding 
importance of children’s interests, it is unlikely that the courts will relinquish the principle. In a 
clash between claims and counter-claims of rights, it is apparent from the jurisprudence of 
Europe, the USA and the UK that the welfare of children is a ‘good’ that all can agree on. The 
probability is that under the HRA only those rights of adults involved in disputes that correspond 
with current understandings of welfare will be upheld. And in cases of conflict the unity and 
autonomy of the nuclear family may be seen as most important for children’s welfare. 
 
What would be more helpful to grandparents than rights would be the development of a body of 
expert knowledge that designated grandparent contact as having an important part to play in 
securing most children’s well-being. Yet more recent research on the benefits of grandparent-
grandchild contact, for example, is sparse and ambivalent and not sufficiently weighty to support 
such a conclusion.131 Government ‘education’ could be influential if the policy developments  
heralded by Supporting Families (Home Office, 1998) lead to the  internalisation by 
professionals and parents of the importance to children of a wider kinship network. But until 
courts do conclude that contact by grandparents should, in general, be supported, their interests 
will be be subordinated to those of the nuclear family. Given that it is usually parents who 
undertake the day to day responsibilities for raising their children, perhaps that is as it should be. 
Any other outcome could result in what the Law Commission once referred to as ‘rights without 
responsibilities’.  
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